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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
To  eliminate  incursions  of  foot-and-mouth  disease  (FMD)  quickly,  a combination  of  measures,  including
emergency  vaccination,  can  help  block  the  spread  of infection.  For  the  earliest  recovery  of the  FMD-free
status  for trade,  without  the  slaughter  of  uninfected  vaccinated  animals,  a serosurvey  for  antibodies  to
FMD  virus  non-structural  proteins  (NSP)  must  be used  to substantiate  absence  of occult  virus infections.
Areas  of doubt  over  requirements  for  post-vaccination  serosurveillance  and  its  feasibility  include  the
required  and  achievable  conﬁdence,  the amount  of  sampling  necessary,  and  the  appropriate  responses
to and  consequences  of different  seropositive  ﬁndings.  This  derives  largely  from  uncertainty  over  the
extent  of  localised  pockets  of virus  infection  that  may  remain  within  vaccinated  populations  and  the
circumstances  that permit  this.  The  question  therefore  remains  whether  tests  are  sufﬁciently  sensitive
and  speciﬁc  to detect  and  eliminate  infected  animals,  without  excessive  culling  of  uninfected  animals,
before  vaccinated  animals  mix with  non-vaccinated  livestock  when  movement  restrictions  are  lifted.  It
is recommended  to  change  the  rationale  for  serosurveillance  after  emergency  vaccination.  Only  when
emergency  vaccination  is used  in  limited  outbreaks  is  it possible  to test  and  cull  comprehensively,  an
approach  compatible  with  a  three-month  minimum  period  to  recover  the  FMD-free  status.  In other  situa-
tions,  where  emergency  vaccination  is used,  such  as  dealing  with  large  outbreaks  in animal-dense  regions
and  where  the  onset  of vaccination  has  been  delayed,  post-vaccination  serosurveys  should  be  targeted
and  focus  on providing  an assurance  to  detect  higher  levels  of  infection,  in  case  of inadequate  control
measures.  As this  provides  less  assurance  of  absence  of infection,  the  approach  would  be  compatible  with
a six-month  waiting  period  for  free-status  recovery  and  should  be  complemented  by other  methods  to
provide  evidence  that vaccination  and control  measures  have  been  effectively  implemented,  as  these  are
the best  guarantee  against  continuing  virus transmission.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license. Introduction
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is of variable severity, dairy cat-
le and pigs showing obvious signs of illness whilst infection can
e mild or sub-clinical, especially in small ruminants and partially
mmune animals. The causative virus can spread by direct con-
act with infected animals, or via contaminated animal products,
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1483 282445.
E-mail addresses: dajapaton@gmail.com, david.paton@pirbright.ac.uk
D.J. Paton).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2014.10.064
264-410X/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
animate and inanimate objects and by atmospheric dispersal. In
ruminants, virus may  persist beyond 28 days in the oropharynx of
so-called “carrier” animals for months to years [1,2]. However, iso-
lation of virus becomes progressively more difﬁcult with time [3,4]
and there is little evidence that carrier livestock can transmit FMD
virus (FMDV) [5].
Control and eventual elimination of FMD  by vaccination has
been effective in mainland Europe [6] and South America [7]
with vaccine used primarily as a prophylactic tool in cattle, and
occasional ring vaccination of sheep and pigs. In many FMD-free
countries, disease introductions were controlled by stamping out
[8]. After the outbreaks of 2001, the EU Directive on FMD  control
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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as revised [9]; one aim being to encourage the use of vaccina-
ion with retention of vaccinated animals. Outbreak control still
equires the killing and destruction of all FMD  susceptible animals
n farms where known infected animals are present, with vacci-
ation used as a control measure in uninfected farms. However,
ome EU member states remain reluctant to implement this policy
ithin their contingency plans, whilst other FMD-free regions are
till considering their options for FMD  control. When FMD  caused
arge outbreaks following introductions to South Korea and Japan in
010 and 2011 [10,11], vaccination was delayed. This may  be partly
ttributed to continuing uncertainty amongst policy makers and
rade partners about the feasibility and reliability with which the
MD-free status can be recovered after using this strategy for FMD
ontrol [12,13]. In this paper, we review gaps in knowledge over
MDV persistence and detection in vaccinated populations and
ddress the approaches that can be taken to improve the use and
nterpretation of serosurveillance methods along with the possible
ollow-up actions after positive serological ﬁndings. We suggest
ifferent options for dealing with limited outbreaks compared to
pidemics and that more emphasis should be given to comple-
entary approaches to substantiate the effectiveness of emergency
accination.
. FMD  control in formerly FMD-free countries
FMD  is highly contagious, so rapid action is needed to block
ts spread and eradicate it if introduced into a formerly FMD-free
ountry. This requires surveillance and tracing to diagnose infected
arms, and restrictions on movements of infected and potentially
nfected animals, persons and objects. Farms containing acutely
nfected animals should be culled,1 cleansed and disinfected, which
ay  be extended to the preventive culling of potentially infected
nimals or even to animals that may  be at high risk of future infec-
ion [14]. Emergency vaccination, in and around affected areas, can
upplement, replace or delay preventive culling and the merits and
isadvantages of the two approaches have been compared by com-
utational simulation [15–17]. The larger an outbreak becomes,
he more unacceptable and unfeasible is control by culling, so
actors that predispose to epidemics, favour early adoption of an
mergency vaccination policy [9,18]. Countries free of FMD  beneﬁt
rom access to international trade markets for sale of susceptible
ive animals and their products, especially fresh meat. Loss of this
avourable status after FMD  introduction can be very costly, so
he time to recover the free status affects disease control strategy
election [12].
Once FMD  has been controlled, assurance that the infection has
een eliminated is required to lift local and national disease control
estrictions and to resume trade in livestock and livestock products
19].
. FMD  vaccines and post-vaccination serology to detect
nfection
FMD  vaccines are produced in cell cultures followed by inacti-
ation of infectivity and separation of virus particles from culture
edium, debris and viral non-structural proteins (NSP) [20]. If suf-
cient animals are adequately immunised by vaccination, then
ithin-pen transmission of FMDV will stop [21–24], which willtop between-pen [25] and between-herd transmission [26]. How-
ver, infection may  spread whilst immunity is developing [27].
urthermore, if vaccination is inadequate (e.g. poor vaccine quality,
1 Culling is deﬁned as killing followed by exclusion of carcasses from the food
hain unless processed to inactivate FMDV. (2014) 7050–7056 7051
non-matching vaccine, or insufﬁcient animals correctly vacci-
nated), spread may  continue [28], especially if other measures,
such as movement restrictions, are ineffective [29]. Even well vac-
cinated animals may  become subclinically infected if exposed to
a sufﬁcient viral challenge and vaccinated ruminants can develop
the FMDV carrier state [30,31]. Such animals shed less virus dur-
ing the acute stage of infection compared to unvaccinated animals
with disease [32–34]. At a population level, emergency vaccination
should reduce the overall reproduction ratio below one, but minor
outbreaks can continue due to localised failures of control.
The levels of vaccine-induced antibodies directed towards the
viral structural proteins (SP) can be measured using serological
assays that correlate with the degree of protection [35,36]. Ani-
mals infected with replicating FMDV mount an antibody response
to both the SP and NSP of the infecting virus and therefore, pro-
vided that NSP have been sufﬁciently removed from FMD  vaccines
by puriﬁcation steps during vaccine manufacture, then tests for
antibodies to NSP (NSP ELISA) can be used as indicators that infec-
tion has occurred, regardless of vaccination status; so-called DIVA
tests that differentiate infected from vaccinated animals [13,37].
Following infection, NSP seroconversion takes 7–14 days [38] and
antibodies can be detected in serum for months or years [4,39,40].
Different causes of NSP seropositivity are associated with differ-
ing risks for FMD  transmission and persistence: (1) the animal
might have been infected recently, indicating a high risk that FMDV
might still be circulating in other animals on the premises or on
other epidemiologically linked premises; (2) the animal might have
been infected some time ago, with a greater likelihood that trans-
mission of FMDV no longer occurs; (3) the animal might have
recovered fully from FMDV infection and no longer harbour virus;
(4) the animal might have become a long-term virus carrier; (5) the
NSP seroreactivity may  be non-speciﬁc and the animal in question
might not have had any exposure to FMDV. Although virus persists
at a low level in carrier animals, virological tests for identifying
convalescent animals have a low sensitivity and NSP serology will
detect a higher proportion of virus carriers [4].
A workshop to compare NSP tests [41] showed that the former
Ceditest (now Prionics PrioCHECK® FMDV NS; [42] combined
relatively good sensitivity (Se) and speciﬁcity (Sp) with commer-
cial availability, so its performance characteristics are used for
“NSP tests” in this review. NSP seroconversion is related to the
extent of virus replication, which in turn depends upon levels of
host susceptibility, immune status and the nature and severity of
exposure [33,34]. Therefore, well-vaccinated animals that become
infected may  seroconvert weakly and/or transiently, especially in
the absence of clinical disease, resulting in wide ranges in Se for
detecting different categories of infected animals. Brocchi et al.
reported Se of 68–74% for detecting cattle sampled beyond 28 days
post infection (>28 dpi) using the Ceditest [41]. Vaccinated animals
that progressed to become long-term virus carriers seroconverted
more reliably and could be detected with a higher Se (86–89% for
cattle at >28 dpi). Conversely, subclinical infection after vaccina-
tion was  associated with weak NSP seroconversion (Se of 27% at
>28 dpi). Although the relationship between likelihood of transmis-
sion and degree of subsequent seroconversion in NSP tests remains
unquantiﬁed, the risk of missing a dangerous occurrence of FMDV
transmission is most likely less from failure to detect a transiently
NSP seropositive animal than from failure to detect one that has
strongly seroconverted.
Modelling has been used to extrapolate outbreak and exper-
imental virus transmission data to predict vaccine-based control
in the ﬁeld. This predicts that if vaccination is optimised and
clinical surveillance effectively removes herds with diseased ani-
mals, then the number of undisclosed infected herds and animals
should be small with few carriers [43–45]. Undetected infected ani-
mals would be found mainly in non-vaccinated sheep herds and
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accinated cattle and sheep herds. However, after serosurveilla-
ce, carried out according to the EU Directive, vaccination and
re-emptive culling strategies yielded comparable low numbers
f undetected infected animals [45]. Schley et al. emphasised that
ollowing effective vaccination, the quality of inspection is the prin-
ipal factor inﬂuencing whether or not undisclosed carrier herds
ccur, supporting the importance of other control measures [44].
urther studies are required to model virus persistence in vac-
inated populations through transmission from acutely infected
nimals, rather than from carrier animals, as the former represent
 more signiﬁcant risk for new FMD  outbreaks [12].
NSP serosurveillance of a large number of animals will give rise
o many false positive test reactors, since the tests have imperfect
peciﬁcity (Sp of 98–99.7% for cattle; [41]) and Se/Sp limitations
annot be overcome easily by using a combination of different
SP tests [46]. Furthermore, true positive test results cannot be
istinguished readily from false positive ones [47], although a clus-
er analysis [48] and the use of likelihood ratios to weight the
trength of seroconversion might improve the possible discrimi-
ation [49]. This makes classiﬁcation of the infection status of large
erds difﬁcult. Arnold et al. concluded that in this situation, the
est compromise between maximising the sensitivity for carrier
etection, whilst minimising unnecessary culling, will be met  by
dopting an individual-based testing regime in which all animals
n all vaccinated herds are tested and positive animals rather than
erds are culled [43]. The remaining risk with this approach is that
ny carriers that are missed will be free to move to unvaccinated
erds on national territory once outbreak restrictions are lifted and
hose non-vaccinated animals may  be traded.
. Current OIE guidance and EU legislation on
ost-vaccination measures
Requirements for recovering the FMD-free status where vacci-
ation is not practised are laid out in the OIE Terrestrial Animal
ealth Code (Supplementary Table 1; [19]) and for EU Member
tates in the EU FMD  Directive [9]. With stamping out (culling) of
ffected herds and suitable surveillance, the FMD-free status can be
egained 3 months after the last case. If emergency vaccination is
sed, a 3-month recovery period also applies if the vaccinated ani-
als are killed (so-called “vaccination with subsequent slaughter”),
ut otherwise extends to 6 months (following so-called “vaccina-
ion without subsequent slaughter”) and also requires additional
erosurveillance to substantiate the absence of virus infections. The
IE Code therefore requires that vaccinated animals are tested sero-
ogically to show that there is no ongoing virus transmission or
circulation”, and, in case of countries wishing to recover the sta-
us of “FMD-free where vaccination is not practised”, that infected
nimals are not present. The OIE deﬁnition of infection would
nclude carriers, although these are not speciﬁcally referred to. In
he current FMD  Chapter (8.6) of the OIE Code [19], the articles
n surveillance (articles 42–47 and article 49) describe the princi-
les that should be followed, but do not specify a sampling frame
r design prevalence for detecting virus transmission or infected
including carrier) animals.
The EU Directive on FMD  control gives a more detailed account
f the post-vaccination surveillance required for EU Member States
o recover the status of FMD-free where vaccination is not practiced
Supplementary Table 2, [9]). The requirement in the EU Directive
o sample and test all vaccinated animals and their unvaccinated
ffspring (so-called “census surveillance”) arose from the view that
SP serology should be used as a herd test [50] along with the
esire to provide a high level of conﬁdence that all carriers are
etected and that limited virus transmission within herds is not
verlooked by serological surveillance. This would overcome the (2014) 7050–7056
problem that has led to re-emergence of infection after many years
of apparent freedom, and despite targeted annual serosurveilla-
nce, in countries continuing with prophylactic mass vaccination
after attainment of the status FMD-free where vaccination is prac-
tised [7]. This approach also helps to deal with the so-called “small
herd problem” in which herd-level freedom cannot be demon-
strated with imperfect tests if the expected within-herd prevalence
is low, as it allows small herds to be evaluated as an amalgam-
ated stratum rather than at the herd level [51]. The sampling
requirements are set out in paragraph 3 of Article 56, although
the text appears ambiguous requiring either a sampling protocol
suitable for detecting a 5% in-herd prevalence with at least a 95%
level of conﬁdence or the sampling and testing of all animals in
vaccinated herds. The ﬁrst option is actually intended to be for
non-vaccinated animals within a vaccination zone that are unlikely
to show clear clinical signs (e.g. sheep and goats), but this only
becomes explicit in the context of the referenced Annex III to that
Directive.
Both the OIE Code [19] and the EU Directive [9] require follow-
up investigation of all serologically positive ﬁndings and a return to
the farm to double-check for clinical evidence of FMD and to collect
fresh samples from the originally sampled cohort and a number of
direct contact animals. Serological testing of the samples should
be done to determine whether seroconversion is ongoing, indica-
tive of virus circulation. Samples can also be taken to test for the
presence of virus, including oesophagopharyngeal mucus scrapings
collected with a probang cup to detect virus carriers. An epidemi-
ological enquiry is also required. At the end of these investigations
the herd/ﬂock must be categorised as to whether or not infected
animals are present.
The OIE Code clearly describes in Article 8.61 that the occur-
rence of FMDV infection is conﬁrmed if FMDV is isolated from an
animal [19]. The culling strategies for post-outbreak eradication to
recover the FMD-free status are summarised in Article 8.6.47 as
“the slaughter of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible
animals, but there is no discussion of the requirements to remove
subclinically affected animals (that could be cases of recent, historic
or carrier infection) if identiﬁed only by serology, in the absence of
clinically affected companion animals.
The EU Directive requires the stamping out of holdings contain-
ing at least one animal where the presence of FMDV is conﬁrmed
[9]. As well as depopulation of the susceptible species present, ani-
mal  products must be treated or disposed of and holdings must be
cleansed and disinfected before restocking. Control zones must be
established to monitor and regulate animals in surrounding herds.
On holdings containing NSP reactors but where further testing con-
ﬁrms the absence of circulating FMDV, the NSP positive animals
must be culled. Other test-negative animals in the herd should also
be killed but may  be slaughtered under controlled conditions and
their meat is subject to deboning and maturation (ruminants) or
processing into meat products. In case of pork their carcasses can
go for consumption (Supplementary Table 2). Cleansing and disin-
fection of the premises is still required, but no control zones are
imposed on neighbouring premises. Thus, the actions required are
clearly distinct where acutely infected animals are conﬁrmed (after
their detection by virological means or paired serology) compared
to other situations where NSP seroreactors are found. However,
for both OIE and EU, the presence of a carrier animal (conﬁrmed
by virus detection) would invoke the full implications of a new
outbreak [9,19]. The requirement to kill the whole herd, includ-
ing seronegative animals, when FMD  infection is conﬁrmed only
by serology, could be modiﬁed to meet the recommendations of
Arnold et al. [43], by selectively removing only the seropositive
animals. But the compatibility of this alteration with the require-
ments of the Directive for cleansing, disinfection and controlled
restocking of the herd would also have to be considered.
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The declaration of an outbreak has important implications for
rade. Supplementary Table 3 provides the deﬁnition of an out-
reak of FMD  according to the EU Directive and these deﬁnitions
re themselves consistent with those within the OIE Code [19].
. Feasibility of post-vaccination surveillance
A summary of some of the practical difﬁculties that arise in
sing NSP ELISA to help substantiate FMD  freedom is provided in
upplementary Table 4.
Three workshops in 2007 examined the design and interpreta-
ion of post FMD-vaccination serosurveillance by NSP tests [52].
heir aim was to test the feasibility and consequences of applying
he above-described rules after applying emergency vaccination
n three plausible scenarios involving different outbreak sizes,
ffected species and livestock densities. The summary recommen-
ations of the workshops are provided in Supplementary Table 5
nd the following key issues are further discussed below: (1) the
equirement to sample all vaccinated animals; (2) the follow-up
nvestigation required to establish the signiﬁcance of seroreactors
dentiﬁed; (3) the criteria for removal of seropositive animals and
erds; (4) what can be done with such animals (slaughter for con-
umption or destruction); (5) the impact of ﬁnding seroreactors
uring the process of surveillance with the objective of regaining
he status “FMD free where vaccination is not practised”.
. Discussion
.1. The requirement to sample all vaccinated animals in all
accinated herds
Even with tests of suboptimal sensitivity (70–90%), a low preva-
ence of infection can be detected with high conﬁdence in large
roups of animals without sampling and testing every animal. How-
ver, in large herds, the animals are often segregated in smaller
roups that may  be considered as separate epidemiological units
nd in this case, the number of animals per epidemiological unit
ould be the denominator for calculation of sample sizes. For
SP serosurveillance, using a test with Sp = 0.995 and Se = 0.7, then
etection of seroconversion at 95% conﬁdence, at a prevalence of
%, in an epidemiological unit of 1000 animals, would require 513
nimals to be sampled and the cut-point would be ﬁve (i.e. ﬁnding
ve or fewer reactors could still be consistent with absence of true
eroconversion, i.e. probability of 2% or more seropositive animals
s less than 5%). If it were accepted that only strongly seroconvert-
ng animals are likely to (have) spread infection, then the Se ﬁgure
ould be increased to 0.9, in which case 366 samples would need
o be tested and the cut-point would become four (FreeCalc; [53]).
Reduction of the numbers sampled in large herds is often
elevant for pigs which also do not have risks associated with
he development of FMDV carriers. Clinical disease is also rather
bvious in pigs so that NSP surveys add less value. Therefore,
urveillance in pigs should be targeted towards the identiﬁcation
f disease and virus circulation. Studies on vaccinated pig herds
n Hong Kong suggested an all-or-nothing effect, with widespread
linical disease and NSP seroconversion (49–82% seroprevalence)
r neither clinical disease nor seroconversion [54]. This all-or
othing effect is also seen in transmission studies in pigs, where
xposure to a ﬁxed dose by injection did not lead to infection [21],
ut exposure to large amounts of virus during contact exposure
ed to infection and transmission with clear clinical signs [23]. Sub-
linical infection of vaccinated pigs has been reported, but other
accinated pen-mates showed disease [33]. Studies on experimen-
ally infected pigs showed that there is a rather short duration of (2014) 7050–7056 7053
NSP seroreactivity in infected pigs with declining levels of reactors
after 9 weeks [40].
7. The follow-up investigation required to establish the
signiﬁcance of seroreactors
If the serosurvey aimed at demonstrating freedom from FMD
ﬁnds evidence of NSP reactors within herds, then following retest-
ing and use of conﬁrmatory tests, the number and strength of the
seroreactors will inﬂuence the degree of suspicion that infection
occurred [49]. It can be argued that if farm visits for the initial col-
lection of serum samples have already included careful inspection
of all the animals without ﬁnding any signs of disease and if isolated
NSP positive reactors are subsequently found at a level consistent
with that expected (from the known speciﬁcity of the test used)
there should not need to be any follow-up visits for inspection and
resampling/testing as prescribed in the OIE Code and the EU Direc-
tive [9,19]. Other factors that would mitigate against the need for
a follow-up farm visit include the availability of location data for
individual animals to rule out clustering of positive cases, samples
originating from pigs that do not become long-term virus carriers
and only weak positive test reactor ﬁndings. Such decisions need
to be taken on a case-by-case basis.
If the level of suspicion warrants a follow-up visit, this should
check for clinical signs and clustering of positive animals and
to examine and resample the initially seropositive animals along
with in-contact animals. If clinical or epidemiological evidence for
infection or disease were then found, the usual measures for inves-
tigating a suspect case would be followed. Past infection would be
distinguished from non-speciﬁc reactors by presence or absence
of clustering and by the number and strength of seroreactors rel-
ative to that predicted from the known speciﬁcity of the test [55].
Recent infection would be conﬁrmed by clinical checks and/or
evidence of seroconversion from the second round of sampling
[19,56]. IgM tests could also be helpful in this situation [57]. Oral
or nasal swabs could be collected from pigs and oesophagopha-
ryngeal ﬂuids collected from ruminants for virological testing to
look for evidence of infection [58]. However, the virological tech-
niques have low sensitivity whilst a false positive test ﬁnding could
be difﬁcult to identify. Use of an IgA test has been proposed as
a proxy for the probang virus test [59,60] as FMDV-speciﬁc IgA
antibody in mucosal secretions of the upper respiratory tract of cat-
tle is mainly associated with the continued presence of detectable
virus in a probang cup sample. However, despite the potential
logistic advantages, the IgA test is not yet commercially avail-
able.
8. The consequences of detecting seropositive animals and
herds
In order to regain the FMD-free status quickly, herds containing
infected animals should be culled (stamped out) and their prod-
ucts excluded from the food chain. Evidence of clinical signs and/or
virus circulation would clearly justify this action, but the appro-
priate level of animal removal and of cleansing and disinfection of
the holding when only carriers or animals with evidence of past
infection are identiﬁed, is less straightforward, particularly after
the active outbreak phase, and in vaccinated herds, where immu-
nity should prevent virus spread. The least risky category is that of
animals that have tested NSP positive, but where there is no evi-
dence for carriers or virus transmission and it is highly likely that
the animals are non-speciﬁc reactors in NSP tests.
A range of outcomes provides different levels of suspicion and
conﬁrmation with regard to detection of infection. First, the prior
information, i.e. the degree of suspicion that gave rise to the
7 cine 32 (2014) 7050–7056
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a strong baseline to which further evidence from a serosurvey can
be added to substantiate freedom from infection.054 D.J. Paton et al. / Vac
ampling and testing in the ﬁrst place; e.g. the strength of the
pidemiological link to other cases that have been conﬁrmed and
he degree of clinical suspicion in any sampled animals. Second, the
pdated prior information after the ﬁrst test round, i.e. the number
nd intensity of seropositive reactions and the presence of linkage
r clustering between the seropositive animals. Third, the poste-
ior information, i.e. consistency of the results following retesting
ith the same or alternative tests, combined with the outcome of
 second farm visit with further epidemiological and clinical inves-
igations and subsequent sampling and testing results, including
vidence of virus circulation provided by detection of additional
eropositive animals.
Where unclustered, seropositive animals are detected at a level
hat is not above the predicted false positive detection rate [53]
nd epidemiological and clinical suspicions as well as evidence for
irus circulation have been ruled out, pig herds could be consid-
red free from infection. In the case of ruminants, the worst-case
cenario would be that some of these animals are carriers. To
itigate this risk, the seropositive animals could be sent for slaugh-
er and human consumption so long as the heads of the animals
re removed during processing (‘Conditional slaughter’; [61]). The
emaining herd could be considered uninfected. This is less severe
han current EU legislation. Follow-up testing could be used to
ouble-check absence of seroconversion in the same way as sen-
inels may  be tested after depopulated farms are restocked. This
s a better approach than virological testing of seropositive rumi-
ants to look for virus carriers due to the low sensitivity of the
ests available. For high value individual animals, the cost and
ffort of virological tests might be justiﬁed so as to avoid unnec-
ssary slaughter; multiple sampling and testing being necessary to
mprove test sensitivity [4].
Where the number, strength and clustering of positive NSP test
esults are suggestive of infection, then the herd must be revis-
ted and re-examined and either be declared infected and culled
n its entirety, or if the evidence of infection is equivocal, only the
eropositive animals could be killed initially (conditional slaugh-
er). Other animals on the farm should be closely examined for
linical evidence of infection, possibly sampled virologically via oral
r nasal swabs, and rebled for a second round of serological testing
o ﬁnd out if previously seronegative animals have seroconverted.
f the culled animals are ruminants, then probang and oral or nasal
wabs should be collected at the time of culling for virus isola-
ion. Forwards and backwards tracing should be instigated to ﬁnd
ut if there is evidence of infection in other herds that supplied or
eceived animals or had other signiﬁcant epidemiological contacts
although recent genetic analyses have cast doubt on the predictive
alue of tracing based on indirect routes of transmission—i.e. not
irect animal contacts and movements [62]). If all the follow-up
esting and investigation fails to verify infection, then there may  or
ay not have been a localised infection in the past, but the herd
an now be considered free from infection and the possibility of
ast infection should not affect the timing for a declaration of FMD
reedom. Further evidence of infection could lead to the conclu-
ion that the herd had probably been infected in the past and/or
here was continuing virus circulation. Both scenarios should lead
o culling of the entire herd, but the consequences for declaration
f FMD  freedom could differ. If it were concluded that there was
irus circulation, a new outbreak would be declared. However, it
ight be concluded that only carriers were present and that the
isease had been missed at the time of acute infection concur-
ent to earlier recognised cases of infection. Provided that thorough
racing had not identiﬁed later cases of infection, then such ﬁnd-
ngs might not prolong the period for recovery of the FMD-free
tatus.Fig. 1 provides an overview of the proposed investigative pro-
edure for vaccinated herds.Fig. 1. Decision tree for implementing and interpreting NSP serosurveys.
9. Complementary approaches
Tests of imperfect sensitivity and speciﬁcity cannot guarantee
the detection and subsequent removal of all infected animals if
they are present at a very low prevalence. Instead, NSP serosurveys
should supplement other control measures to detect some undis-
closed cases and to substantiate that infection is not present at a
higher than residual threshold, due to a failure of the FMD control
strategy, whether arising from low vaccine effectiveness, or poorly
enforced sanitary measures and/or surveillance.
The likelihood of infection continuing to spread despite vac-
cination may  be related to four main factors; the infectiousness
of the population immediately prior to vaccination being applied,
the quality of surveillance and of control measures, and the effec-
tiveness of the vaccination programme itself. Evidence should be
collected on all of these risk factors, for example, evidence in sup-
port of the frequency and quality of epidemiological inquiries,
tracing operations, veterinary inspection, and enforcement of
quarantines and movement controls. Speciﬁc measures to demon-
strate vaccine effectiveness should include prior knowledge of the
potency and match of the vaccine used, accurate numerator and
denominator data on the vaccinated population, evidence of an
effective storage and distribution network including cold chain
maintenance, good records of doses used and of vaccine coverage,
and direct demonstration of the quality of immunity induced in
vaccinated animals. This information can be collated and analysed
to predict its effect in disease spread simulation models to provideThe procedure for recognition by OIE of the status of FMD-
free where vaccination is practised requires applicants to provide
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vidence of vaccine effectiveness, including data on population
mmunity arising from immunisation campaigns. This require-
ent is absent from applications for recovery of the status of
MD-free where vaccination is not practised following use of “vac-
ination without subsequent slaughter” [19]. However, random
urveys to monitor population immunity are relatively simple
o perform in terms of both sample collection and sample test-
ng, since farm visits to inspect vaccinated herds will already be
art of the sanitary control measures and because validated tests
or SP antibodies are widely available. Another measure would
e to undertake a heterologous in vivo vaccine potency test to
irectly show the level of protection provided by the vaccine
sed against challenge with the virus causing the outbreaks that
re to be controlled. Such potency tests have been considered
ot worthwhile, as they are too slow to inform a decision on
hether or not to proceed with vaccination. However, results
ould support the downstream application for FMD freedom, as
ell as assisting the interpretation of serosurvey ﬁndings aimed
t demonstrating effective vaccine induced population immunity.
s a minimum, sera could be obtained from vaccinated animals
nd tested serologically against the outbreak virus to show the
egree of in vitro protection from which in vivo protection could be
stimated.
0. Conclusions
In this paper, we review the approaches that can be taken to
mprove the use and interpretation of serosurveillance using FMDV
SP tests. Even though NSP tests that can differentiate infected
rom vaccinated animals have become available, countries are
eluctant to use emergency vaccination as an additional control
easure if FMDV is introduced. One aspect of this problem could
e addressed by equalising, at three months, the minimum period
eeded to reach FMD-free status in the absence of further vac-
ination, regardless of whether “vaccination without subsequent
laughter” or only stamping out are used; or indeed to make this
eriod risk-based and not a set amount of time [12]. In our paper
e mainly evaluate the effect of various surveillance schemes and
he risk of missing infected animals. Based on this evaluation, we
onsider the risk low if all vaccinated ruminants are sampled and
 statistical sample on all the farms with vaccinated pigs (to detect
% prevalence with 95% conﬁdence). In non-vaccinated sheep (or
ther species where clinical signs are often absent) a sample should
e taken to detect 1% of the infected herds with 95% conﬁdence
nd 5% infected animals on those farms with 95% conﬁdence. In
his case a waiting period of 3 months since the last case will
e sufﬁcient (N.B. the ambiguity of sampling in Article 56 of the
U Directive should be corrected). If sampling of all vaccinated
uminants is impossible to achieve, then within and between herd
esign prevalence rates of less than or equal to 5% and 1% should
e used for NSP serosurveys. The risk of missing infected animals is
hen higher, and a waiting period of six months after the last case
hould be applied. Follow-up of positive NSP reactors should be
erformed on a case-by-case approach in which laboratory, epi-
emiological and other information is used in decision-making.
ince an effective control programme is the best guarantee that the
hreat of FMDV infection has been dealt with, more effort should
e directed towards demonstrating this, speciﬁcally with more
mphasis on demonstrating vaccine effectiveness. Countries using
mergency vaccination could undertake a heterologous in vivo
accine potency test to directly show the level of protection pro-
ided by the vaccine used against challenge with the virus causing
he outbreak and to provide serological correlates of protection to
alibrate SP serosurveys of the population immunity achieved by
accination. Delaying the decision to vaccinate so as to avoid the
[ (2014) 7050–7056 7055
complications of post-vaccination surveillance will make matters
worse if vaccination cannot ultimately be avoided.
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